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Abstract 
One can analyze and forecast the inflationary potential in 
the Puerto Rican economy using the “P* model.” Given 
the nature of the monetary sector in Puerto Rico (PR), 
the model is put into the context of variables from the 
mainland United States (US).  The results indicate a 
long-run relationship between the money supply (M1) of 
the US and the price level in PR, between M1 and real 
production in PR, and between M1 and the prime rate in 
PR.  The implications for forecasting and policy are 
discussed.  
JEL Codes: C32, C52, C53 
Key Words: Econometric Modeling, Time Series 
Analysis, Forecasting Methods, Monetary Economics. 
I.  Introduction  
 
Inflation is a global problem almost all countries have 
suffered from one time or another. Due to the recent 
history of high inflation in Latin America, many 
governments still hold the management of the price level 
as a primary objective of policy. In a number of countries 
in the region, high inflation rates have negatively 
impacted levels of investment while also distorting the 
                                                 
tradeoffs between consumption and saving.  Puerto Rico 
(PR) is unique in that the commonwealth government 
has not considered inflation in its policy agenda. 
Nevertheless, inflationary pressures in PR exist and one 
need only point out that factor price increases in raw 
materials, salaries, intermediate inputs, etc., have had a 
direct effect in destabilizing the economy of island over 
the last thirty years.  
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The main reason for ignoring inflation in PR owes 
greatly to the relationship of the island with the mainland 
US. A majority of imported products, be they final goods 
or intermediary, hail from the mainland. Likewise, the 
minimum salary is determined in Washington and the 
currency is the US dollar. Puerto Rican politicians have 
made the assumption PR is a price(-level) taker. 
Given the adverse effects of inflation on the island, one 
should question the price(-level) taker assumption and 
understand the degree to which commonwealth public 
policy may control inflation. One may turn to P* model as 
an indicator of the evolution of magnitudes of price levels 
and expected inflation. (see, for example, Hall and Mine, 
1994; Hallman and Anderson, 1995; Orphanides and 
Porter, 1998; Galindo, 1997).  The P* model arose out of 
the necessity to estimate the relationship between 
monetary aggregates and production levels; indicators 
are sought for long-run tendencies in the price level.  
The model has also been used to gauge the feasibility of 
economic policy in the control of price levels (Allen and 
Hall, 1991). Its advantage lies in the capacity of the 
model to forecast prices using simple rules regarding 
movements in production levels and monetary 
aggregates. Nevertheless, such forecasts assume the 
circulation velocity of money is a constant and that one 
can use the interest rate as a proxy for the opportunity 
costs of money (Orphanides and Porter, 1998).   * The author wishes to thank Professors Joseph Vogel, Juan 
Lara, and Wilfredo Toledo, for their helpful comments and 
suggestions. 
The P* model measures inflationary potential by 
estimating the price level toward which the economy is 
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adjusting in the long run as a function of the quantity of 
money in circulation (Galindo, 1997).  Equilibrium is 
assumed in the long run for both the circulation velocity 
of money as well as the corresponding level of 
production. Any permanent change in the circulation 
velocity of money or in the level of potential production 
would generate a permanent divergence between the 
real price level and that forecasted by the model. 
Therefore, the estimated value of the price level in the 
long-run can serve as a robust indicator of current 
monetary conditions. 
Despite encouraging empirical findings from the P* 
model, some authors (Orphanides and Porter, 1995; 
Arnold, 1995) question the causality between price 
levels and monetary aggregates. Inasmuch as 
production levels are a function of expectations, the 
circulation velocity may also be a function of 
expectations. In the case of Puerto Rico, the money 
supply is endogenous to the market and not 
administered by the government or any other 
autonomous entity in the island.1 Given such 
dependence, one quickly deduces that PR has little to no 
control over the evolution of inflation and cannot target 
price levels by means of monetary policy.  Similarly, 
given the asymmetrical relationship between the two 
economic systems, the price-level in PR does not 
significantly affect the price-level on the mainland. 
However, this high degree of dependence of the island 
economy may throw doubt on the assumption of a stable 
circulation velocity of money. To understand the 
instability, the P* model will estimate the error correction 
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1 Due to a high level of integration of capital markets with the 
mainland US, the economy of PR is not affected significantly 
by international economic instability and external flows of 
capital.  
 
by considering the prime interest rate as a measure of 
the opportunity costs of maintaining money balances 
(Rodríguez y Toledo, 2003). The following application 
attempts to analyze not only the impact of inflation on 
the island economy but also the role the P* model may 
play in the public policy debate.   
 
II. The history of inflation in Puerto Rico  
 
PR became a Commonwealth of the US in 1952. The 
negotiation of Commonwealth status culminated in a 
Puerto Rican constitution that would specify the areas of 
intervention between the federal government of the US 
and that of territorial government of PR. Although the 
constitution of PR did not really change the fundamental 
relationship between the two governments, the new 
status was nevertheless beneficial to the dominant 
political party in PR (Partido Popular Democrático) as 
well as to Washington, as it seemed to address the 
United Nations mandate for decolonisation (Villamil, 
1975).  Coincidentally, the political settlement of 
commonwealth status accompanied the emergence of 
the US as the dominant country throughout the world. 
The island quickly became a logical choice for US 
hegemony in both political and economic terms in the 
wake of the Second World War and the onset of the 
Cold War, with all its concomitant military expenditures.  
Given the geopolitics of the day, Washington gave 
priority to resolving long-standing problems in PR 
through an economic strategy of development through 
investment and export. In exchange, the PR government 
would show flexibility and abandon its previous reform 
program. For example, in 1947, the First Law of Industry 
Incentives (Ley de Incentivos Industriales) was approved 
which gave a tax holiday on profits for foreign companies 
working on the island. The following year, in a show of 
liberalization. the government of PR would sell the 
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factories it had recently sponsored under the program of 
Fomento2  The objective of both moves was to attract a 
variety of industries to the island and the model of 
development became known in English by the metaphor 
“Operation Bootstrap” or in Spanish “Operación Manos a 
la Obra” (literal translation: Operation-Hands at Work). 
Through the fiscal incentives of Operation Bootstrap, 
the island began industrializing and fundamental 
transformations took place in the productive processes 
of the island economy.  During the initial phase (1947-
1956), labor-intensive light manufacturing was attracted 
(Departamento de Comercio, 1979; Dietz, 1989; Villamil, 
1975), consisting primarily of textiles which consumed 
little energy and generated low levels of pollution. 
However, textiles are a quintessentially competitive 
industry and generated only low levels of profit. The 
comparative advantage in textiles shifted quickly in the 
wake of the Kennedy Round of the GATT negotiation, 
which lowered tariffs on labor-intensive manufacture 
from the Far East. In other words, any efficiency 
advantage of the island in the production of textiles did 
not compensate for the differential salaries between PR 
and, say, Hong Kong. This deteriorating comparative 
advantage was accentuated by implementation of the 
US federal minimum wage in the island. One can even 
say that, during this period, inflation was driven by 
compliance with the mandated US minimum wage floor. 
 The second stage of industrialization (1956-1973) 
witnessed construction of refineries and a large-scale 
petrochemical industry both, driven by a federal quota 
system that apportioned importations of petroleum to 
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2  A national and international boycott of the government 
financed factories (Fomento) also precipated their closure. 
Nevertheless, the closure may also be attributed to the 
difficulties in establishing distribution channels with the larger 
market (Lewis, 1949). 
distinct states. The absolute and relative role of labor 
diminished with respect to capital during this second 
phase.3 Inasmuch as both refineries and petrochemicals 
are highly energy-intensive, both would also be highly 
polluting. (Commerce Departament, 1979; Dietz, 1989; 
Villamil, 1975). Therefore, the subsidy was both fiscal 
and environmental. The hope of the island government 
was the development of oil-refining capacity would 
generate supplies of intermediary products for local 
industry while also reducing the energy dependence of 
the island. For example, an ample supply of relatively 
low cost electric power would facilitate energy-intensive 
industries like aluminum, broadening the raw material 
base of PR. However, that did not happen. Industry 
tended to prefer proximity to its markets rather than 
proximity to its inputs. (Villamil, 1975). 
  One can argue that Operation Bootstrap made PR 
little more than a “manufacturing enclave” within the US. 
The sole advantage for PR seemed to be the 
employment that would be generated from final 
assembly; the disadvantages appeared manifold. The 
latter begin with the fact that most businesses were 
administered from the US, employing almost no local 
management; likewise, the lion’s share of inputs came 
from the mainland. Local light industries would now have 
to compete directly with those from the mainland whose 
variable costs were far lower. For these industries, factor 
prices had increased, thereby aggravating already extant 
structural problems. The tourism sector was also not 
exempt from these costs increases, which were 
compounded by high transportation costs to/fro the 
 
3  As seen in Box 3 of the Appendix (Statistical Series), the 
mean of gross internal investment in fixed capital went from a 
minimum value of 73.9 million dollars in 1947 to a maximum 
value of 973.5 in 1972.
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island. To make matters worse, the government did not 
undertake an adequate promotional campaign to 
promote the island on the mainland. Generalized factor 
price increases were exaggerated in food markets due to 
quasi-monopolistic conditions and, in 1974, the Planning 
Board of PR formally called for expansion of the antitrust 
section of the Justice Department and for a clear policy 
that would deploy the Import and Distribution 
Corporation to encourage competition.  The fact that 
nothing happened is evidence of the political strength 
underpinning the structural problems on the island. For 
the most vulnerable segments of the population, faced 
with high price levels and low levels of employment, 
migration to the mainland became the relief valve 
(Perloff, 1952). Nevertheless, migration and the 
subsequent remittances did not resolve the economic 
instability generated by inflation and unemployment. 
By the mid-sixties, measures were being proposed to 
address the structural problems of integration with the 
federal system.  Among the proposals were certain job 
classifications being exempt from the US minimum 
wage, the reduction of legal holidays, and a moratorium 
on new fringe benefits. Restrictions on foreign 
investment was also discussed in the context of the 
possibility that the majority of Puerto Rican government 
bonds might end up in the hands of foreign investors 
aggravating the political dependency of the economy 
and leading to the real possibility of capital flight, with all 
the attendant negative impacts for public finance. Such 
arguments were generally ignored. 
The year 1976 may be considered a watershed in the 
economic development of PR. For the previous thirty 
years, the strategy of economic development had been 
based on attracting foreign capital via tax holidays, de 
jure and de facto subsidies (infrastructure and the 
environment) and relatively low salary scales (Quiñones, 
1994).  Section 936 of the Federal Tax Code
Rodríguez: P* Model of Inflation in Puerto Rico 
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4 of 1976 
took effect and granted a credit for income generated 
from assets and liabilities originating in PR as well as for 
taxes paid on foreign income. A deduction would also 
apply to dividends remitted to the parent company (Junta 
de Planificación, 1994; Ruiz y Zalacaín, 1996). Most of 
the multinational companies who responded to these 
fiscal incentives hailed from the US. 
 Section 936 was created to attract foreign investment 
in PR and offset some of the negative impacts of 
compliance with other federal laws, viz., the minimum 
wage and the Jones Act5. There is little doubt the 
incentive package enabled the development of a high 
technology sector on the island which would become 
one of the most dynamic sectors (Quiñones, 1994)6.   
 
4  The antecedents to Section 936 originate in 1921 with 
Section 262.  Section 262 of the Federal Income Tax Code 
was designed for US companies established in the Philippine 
Islands, then a possession of the US. The requirements to 
qualify for exemption under the Section were: at least 80 
percent of the income would originate from commercial 
activities in the possession and 50 percent or more from 
incomes that originated in company operations in the 
possession (the condition 80-50). In 1955, this law was 
incorporated into the Federal Income Tax Code as Section 
931, which continued offering a full exemption to incomes 
generated from US corporations in Puerto Rico, American 
Samoa, Guam and the Panama Canal. 
5   The Act requires island-mainland ship transportation fly 
under the American flag (one of the most expensive in the 
world), imposes US citizenship on Puerto Ricans, and reserves 
to the US all powers correspondent to customs, immigration, 
mail services, maritime law, defense, commerce and all 
matters relating to sovereignty. 
6  More than 60 percent of the 936 firms are in clothing, 
pharmaceuticals, machinery, and scientific and professional 
instrumentation (Catalá, 1993)
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Businesses operating under Section 936 generated, 
both directly and indirectly, a large number of jobs and 
investment. The new activity also contributed to the tax 
coffers of the island through taxes on the repatriation of 
profits, income, and patents. Nevertheless, President 
Clinton overturned Section 936 on August 20, 1996 and 
a transition period was established for the phasing out of 
the incentives. During this period, the government is to 
seek new stimuli for industrial development. However, 
the flaw in such reasoning is the assumption that PR 
enjoys instrumental complementarity; indeed, the only 
significant attraction of capital to the island seems to 
have been the tax incentives (Catalá, 1993).  
To this day, the nature of the problem of economic 
development in PR is not really distinct from what it was 
thirty years ago. None of the measures inspired by the 
various development models has fundamentally resolved 
structural problems of development. One sees persistent 
economic instability as well as a recent decline in the 
real Gross Domestic Product, a high level of 
unemployment and a downward cycle of fixed capital 
investment accompanied by inflation rates higher than 
those on the mainland. Nevertheless, the standard of 
living of Puerto Ricans does not seem to have borne the 
full brunt of this instability, cushioned by federal transfers 
and pubic and private debt that, in turn, translate into 
inflationary pressures from the demand side. 
In summary, one can say that the inflation in Puerto 
Rico over the last generation originates more in the 
supply side than in the demand. The evidence suggests 
that inflation in factor prices has led only partially to 
heightened consumer demand. For example, the very 
high population density of the island and its legal status 
within the US, translated into steady and significant 
increases in the real price of land. To the extent that 
locally owned assets (e.g., land) were being liquidated 
for consumption, the causation of inflationary pressure 
runs from the supply to the demand side. Unraveling the 
inflationary behavior of the Puerto Rican economy can 
help policy-makers perceive what measures are indeed 
available to them and thereby challenge the facile 
assumption that the island is merely a price(-level) taker. 
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III.  Putting the model in the context of Puerto Rico 
 
With the widespread assumption that inflation is 
lockstep with the US economy, there has been an 
absence of analysis of the evolution of inflation in PR. 
No consensus exists among economists in PR regarding 
the variables that determine inflation on the island nor 
any consideration of the possible role of public policy. To 
fill this lacuna, the following P* model is proposed as an 
indicator for expected inflation.  The advantages of the 
model can be itemized: 
1. One can include internal variables, like production 
level in PR, as well as the usual variables of the US 
economy that directly affect the magnitude of inflation. 
2. One can forecast prices based on patterns in the 
behaviour of production levels and monetary 
aggregates, assuming the circulation velocity of money 
is constant as determined by the opportunity costs of 
money (Orphanides and Porter, 1998); 
3. One can identify inflationary potential by estimating 
the price level to which the inflation will tend to adjust in 
the long run, as these are a function of the quantity of 
money in circulation (Galindo, 1997).  Such estimation is 
grounded in the assumption that the circulation velocity 
of money and the potential production will seek 
equilibrium levels in the long run.   
4. By comparing the real level of prices to that 
forecasted, one can also identify permanent changes in 
the national economy with respect to the circulation 
velocity of money or in the potential production level  
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A word of caution: because the island does not have 
absolute control over inflation, traditional monetary policy 
is not possible nor could the island ever impact the US 
variables in the model. Despite this, the P* model can be 
used as a general identity to analyze the behavior of the 
inflation rate in PR and the inertial effect based on the 
estimation of an error correction model.    
One begins by considering the peculiar relationship of 
the economy of PR to that of the US. In a number of 
works, inflation in Puerto Rico has been found to be a 
monetary phenomenon.  Toledo (2000) finds it so in both 
the short run and long run and claims a relationship of 
co-integration exists between inflation in Puerto Rico and 
the monetary supply in the United States.  This result 
was also supported in a simplified IS-LM model of the 
Puerto Rican economy. (Rodríguez 2002) 
The scenario described above has been greatly 
complicated by unanticipated interventions in US 
monetary policy, whose reverberations pass through the 
interest rates on federal funds.  Such events impact 
unemployment and inflation in PR for a prolonged 
transitional period as the island economy is not resilient 
to immediate shocks. Toledo y Rodríguez (2003) have 
found both inflation and unemployment rates respond to 
the reduction in the interest rate on federal funds. The 
temporary effect of an increase in the federal fund rate to 
the inflation rate is negative but the permanent effect is 
positive. As expected, the unemployment rate tends to 
decline as a result of falling interest rates.   
One can conceptualise the interest rate as a 
mechanism of transmission for the monetary policy of 
the US on PR. This means that the economic agents in 
PR should take into account fluctuations in the 
magnitude of US monetary policy instruments, which will 
subsequently generate macroeconomic shocks in PR 
that reverberate over time.  
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IV. Theoretical  Framework 
 
The P* model is based on the feasibility of using a 
monetary aggregate with unitary elasticity with respect to 
prices as an indicator of their the long-run relationship.  It 
is an expression of the quantitative equation of money 
(Galindo, 1997; Orphanides and Porter, 1998) using the 
Unites States money supply: 7 
 
=                                                               (1) 
 
where:  
 
Mt = money supply of the United States; 
Vt = money circulation velocity in Puerto Rico; 
Pt = level of prices of Puerto Rico; 
Yt = national production of Puerto Rico. 
 
The equilibrium level of prices (P*) can be obtained 
from  (1): 
 
t
tt
t Y
VM
P =*
p m y vt t t t
                                                            (2) 
 
Applying natural logarithms, the estimation of (2) is 
represented by:  
 
t= + + +β β β ε1 2 3
                                                
                                  (3) 
 
where the lowercase letters denote natural logs.  In this 
equation β1 = 1, β2 = -1 and β3 = 1.  The equation also 
 
7 Although the variable M1 is a saving and transactions 
instrument, it shows a great structural stability with the 
variables of study. 
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presents a simple rule to forecast behavior of prices, 
assuming that the velocity of money is constant.  A way 
to improve the predictive capacity of the model, without 
unduly complicating it, is to estimate separately the 
circulation velocity of (3) and then substitute that value 
for the vector zt.  Such a procedure allows a better 
simulation of the circulation velocity of money in PR and 
facilitates the search for a less restrictive form that 
incorporates the distinct dynamic responses of changes 
in the money supply and the level of economic activity.  
 
p m y zt t t t* = + + + tβ β β ε1 2 3
p m y rt t t t= + + +
                               (4) 
εt ~ N(0,σ2) 
 
A typical short-cut is to substitute the interest rate for 
the velocity of money. The use of the interest rate can be 
defended given the dependence of the island economy 
on that of the mainland and the correspondence 
between circulation velocity of money in PR and the 
prime interest rate in the US.  The long-run relationship 
between the money supply and the prime rate of the US 
and real production and the level of prices in PR This is 
also corroborated with empirical evidence (Rodríguez, 
2002; Toledo, 2000).  So, the prime rate is presented as 
an approximation of the circulation velocity of money and 
equation (3) can be rewritten as 
 
tβ β β ε1 2 3
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∆
                                  (5) 
εt ~ N(0,σ2) 
 
where β1 = 1 and β2 = -1 and β3 = 1 ( Hall and Mine, 
1994; Bordes, Girardin and. Marimoutou , 1993). 
Equation (5) is then estimated using the Johansen 
procedure (1988) to determine the presence of co-
integration. Such determination is necessary when a 
combination of variables exist that share similarity in the 
order of integration, suggesting the necessity of using 
series that co-integrate to obtain unbiased and 
consistent estimates and, thereby, avoid the problem of 
spurious correlation (Rodríguez, 2001).  When a 
relationship of co-integration is present in the series, the 
residual variance is minimized in the parametric space 
and the resulting estimates are highly consistent and will 
converge on their true value. (Rodríguez, 2001; Novales, 
1997; Maddala, 1996; Johnston y DiNardio, 1997) 
If the specification of the existence of this phenomenon 
is in error, one will accept as valid those relationships 
that are merely spurious in the process of drawing 
inference (Bhargava, 1986; Maddala, 1996; Maddala 
and Kim, 1998; Enders, 1995). In terms of political 
economy, this means that an incorrect execution of the 
analysis, will lead to erroneous conclusions in policy 
making (Rodríguez, 2001).  Such caution is warranted 
for any econometric model that uses time series.  
If there is a co-integration relation among the variables 
in the model, the short-run dynamics of this relationship 
can be represented in an error correction model:8 
 
∆ ∆
∆ ∆
p p p p m
y r
t t t
t t t
t= − + +
+ + +
− −
− −
−α α α
α α ξ
11 1 12 1 13 1
14 1 15 1 1
( *)
                                                
        (6) 
ξ1t ~ N(0,σ2) 
 
The lagged difference terms capture the effects of the 
series, like for example, transportation costs, short-term 
changes in production and the financial sector, and other 
peculiarities of the economy of the island which affect 
 
8 As only annual production data exists, an annual periodicity 
is used. If prices need to be forecasted monthly or quarterly, 
the utilized variable (parameter) can be replaced by any 
measure that is a good indicator of short-run economic activity. 
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prices in the short run.  The model can also include the 
effects between the gap of real production and the 
potential production, which can be associated to a 
change in prices as a direct result of pressures over the 
installed capacity or to the differential between the level 
of unemployment and potential production (Kuttner, 
1989; Galindo, 1997).  That is to say, changes in the 
level of prices will have real effects, which can be 
transmitted through out several periods.  In this case, 
consider the following model: 
 
∆
∆ ∆ ∆
p p p y y p
m y r
t t t t
t t t t
= − + − +
+ + + +
− − −
− − −
α α α
α α α µ
11 1 12 1 13 1
14 1 15 1 16 1 1
( *) ( *)
( *) ( *) (p p v v y yt t− = − + −
ggp p pt ij t= − −
  (7) 
 
The dynamics of inflation is modeled assuming that 
any increments in the monetary supply generate 
increments in the price level.  Nevertheless, the 
presence of idle capacity leaves:  
 
*) t                           (8) 
 
This equation indicates the deviations in the observed 
price level and that forecasted should be compensated 
with fluctuations in the velocity of money and the total 
production (Galindo, 1997).  Inflation (gpt) can be 
modeled under the assumption that it tends toward its 
equilibrium value and the growth rate of inflation (ggpt) 
can be estimated in its simpler form (Galindo, 1997): 
 
φ ( *) 1
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ggp p p i ggpt t t i
i
t= − + +− −
=
∑δ δ ϕ11 1 12 1
1
1( *) ( )∆
gp p p i gp
i z
t t t i
t i
i
t
= − +
+ +
− − −
=
− −
=
∑
∑
γ γ
γ ζ
11 1 12 1
1 1
13 1
1
1
( *) ( )
( )
∆
∆
                                              (9) 
 
Equation (9) tells us that the rate of growth of inflation 
accelerates when p*>p and vice versa.  In this case, the 
general form of the model of price gap can be solved:  
− (10) 
 
This model can also be expressed in the equivalent 
form for inflation (Hallman, Porter and Small, 1991; 
Orphanides and Porter, 1998): 
 
            (11) 
 
V. Empirical Evidence 
 
The series are of annual frequency for the period 1964 
to 1997. The variables used in the P* model are the 
consumer price index (li), the real production level (ly), 
the prime rate (lr) and the money supply (M1) of the US 
(lm).  All variables are expressed as natural logs. 
The tests of unitary roots in Table 1 indicate all 
variables show the same order of integration. The 
existence of similarity in the order of integration in the 
series demonstrates a stable relationship over time, 
which suggests stability is achieved in the long run 
(Novales, 1997; Bhargava, 1996).9 This result is 
important as it suggests the relevance of the price 
equation in the long-run (Rodríguez, 2002).  So, the 
necessity arises of using series that co-integrate in order 
to obtain unbiased and consistent estimates that do not 
suffer from the problem of spurious correlation. As long 
                                                 
9 The determination of the order of integrabilitiy of a series is 
fundamental and not doing it correctly, in terms of political 
economy, can lead to erroneous conclusions in decision-
making.  
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as co-integration exists among the variables, the 
relationship will not hold due to theoretical reasons 
rather than due to the magnitude of the variables.  
In order to determine the existence of the long-run 
relationship among the variables, a model of 
autoregressive, unconstrained, lagged vectors is 
estimated. According to Table 2, the results indicate the 
presence of at least two vectors of co-integration. The 
existence of more than one vector of co-integration leads 
to the rejection of the test of weak exogeneity, as shown 
in Table 3. This suggests it is not possible to make valid 
statistical inferences using only one equation. This leads 
one to conclude there is a strong feedback between the 
level of economic activity and the price level.  
One should note well the alpha values are close to 
zero which means that, in spite of weak exogeneity, the 
variables considered contain relevant information to 
explain the behavior of the system.  By being so low, any 
exclusion of some of the variable would invalidate 
statistical inference and lose relevant information in 
subsequent estimations of the information generating 
process (Ericsson and Irons, 1994; Rodríguez, 2002).  
So, in rejecting the weak exogeneity hypothesis, one 
should include more than one co-integration vector for 
each equation in the error correction form (Ericsson and 
Irons, 1994; Rodríguez, 2002). 
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Table I 
Order of integration of the series by means of the 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF)a and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          *Indicates 95 percent of significance 
 
Table II 
Cointegration tests for lpt, lyt, lmt, lrt 
Eigenvalue  Ho:rank = p 
                       
-T ln(1-λp+ 1)a 
           
95% 
0.959 p = = 0 105.87 15.00 
0.707 p < = 1 40.47 11.23 
0.164 p < = 2 5.91 7.37 
0.018  p < = 3 0.6 2.98 
Eigenvalue  Ho:rank = p -T Σln(1-λp+ 1)b 
   
95% 
0.959 p = = 0 152.85** 36.58 
0.707 p < = 1 46.98* 21.58 
0.164 p < = 2 6.51 10.35 
0.018  p < = 3 0.6 2.98 
a/ -T in(1 - λ p+ 1) = maximum characteristic root test; 
b/ - T Σ ln(1 - λ p+ 1) = trace test; 
It doesn't include intercept neither tendency. 
 
By normalizing the first cointegration vector of the 
model, the restated equation is: 
 
li ly lm lr= − + +0 310 1037 0106. * . * . *               (12) 
Variable   ADF PP
pt -1.754 -1.055 
Dpt  
  
  
  
  
  
  
-2.862* -2.300*
mt -1.136 -0.878
Dmt -3.235* -2.818*
yt -0.971 -1.475
Dyt -5.369* -5.105*
Rt -3.055 -2.088
DRt -5.553* -3.928*
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Maximum Likelihood Test: χ2(2) = 11.98 
 
The signs are as expected in standard economic 
theory.  The parameters indicate the relationships  
economic agents use to maintain the prices in the path 
toward equilibrium mean short-run price level dynamics 
can be interpreted in an error correction model. 
 
Table III 
Weak exogeneity tests for the price equation 
    r  DGF χ2 (r)    LP       LY       LM       LR 
  1   1    3.84   45.67   27.61   43.80    0.17 
  2   2    5.99   60.58   47.96   44.69    2.66 
  3   3    7.81   62.84   49.86   48.95    5.46 
 
 
Table IV 
Alpha Parameters for the price equation 
           dlpt     dlmt     dlyt        dlrt 
dlpt    0.125   0.410  0.062    0.000 
dlyt      0.073   0.048  0.040    0.000      
dlmt    0.150   0.012 –0.167   -0.000     
dlrt       0.034   0.161  0.800   -0.001 
 
The tests of strong exogeneity, summarized in Table V, 
indicate the presence of a feedback effect between the 
level of prices and economic activity.  In other words, 
unexpected changes in the level of the economic activity 
are being directly transferred to the price level.  The 
surprise effect in prices will affect the expectations of 
economic agents and, therefore, real production 
(Hoover, 1981). 
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Table V 
Granger Causality Tests 
 Lag lpt → lyt 
1  2.822*
Lag lyt → lpt 
1  4.116*
Lag lpt → lrt 
1  0.003
Lag lrt → lpt 
1  13.569*
 
The results obtained mean that the generating process 
of information is an approximation to forecast inflation 
stemming from P*.  The final model, presented in Table 
VI, does not have autocorrelation problems [LM χ2 (4): 
9.880], heteroskedasticity [ARCH χ2 (2):2.507] and the 
errors are normally distributed [JBχ2(2):0.341].  
 
Table VI 
Inflation Model 
  
Dependent Variable: LI 
Method: Seemingly Unrelated equations 
Date: 04/09/02   Time: 08:47 
Sample(adjusted): 1966 1997 
Included observations: 32 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.535658 0.311386 1.720240 0.0973
ECO(-1) 
 
 
 
 
-3.541897 0.905738 3.910509 0.0006
DI 0.286898 0.267726 1.071612 0.2937
DY -11.04772 2.881736 -3.833704 0.0007
DM -1.603489 2.045034 -0.784089 0.4401
DR 0.795845 0.462270 1.721604 0.0970
R-squared 0.583206     Mean dependent var 1.531061
Adj R-squared 0.503053     S.D. dependent var 0.501789
S.E. regression 0.353733     Akaike info criterion 0.926814
SSR 3.253309     Schwarz criterion 1.201639
Log likelihood -8.829023     F-statistic 7.276183
Prob(F-stat)         0.000223 
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VI. Conclusión 
 
Analysis of the present and future evolution of prices in 
PR is essential for sound public policy.  However, few 
studies have analyzed the evolution of the prices in PR 
in either the short or long run; the P* model offers a 
feasible framework to meet this need. According to the 
results obtained of the application, one may say that the 
price level in Puerto Rico is a monetary variable that is 
influenced by both the monetary policy of the United 
States and the economic activity of the island.   
The VAR model captures the empirical regularities in 
the evolution of prices. Through the Johansen 
procedure, two co-integration vectors have been 
established and an estimate then made for the long-run 
equation of prices. The signs conform to that expected in 
standard economic theory and the statistical tests 
yielded satisfactory results.  One concludes that the 
long-run evolution of the price level can be obtained by 
calculating the co-integration error of the MCE of the 
price level, which can then be used to estimate the 
future inflation of PR for local policy purposes. 
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